Nagel, Chisholm, and Locke †Metaphysics of the Mind Essay

It is very difficult to attri exactlye characteristics to a pass when we know it does non actually exist in the strong-arm realm. Though, individual-to-person identity operator element element has been connected to the mind. However, it is tricky to determine what exactly comprises whizs private identity. Although it is a difficult concept to grasp, philosophers such as Nagel and Chisholm endeavour to construct their custody position on the characteristics of the mind. By comparing Nagel and Chisholms positions on personal identity, it is evident that identity is a education of both body and mind.Nagel shows that we can non right pose a mind, and if this is the case thus it is impossible to attri al unitarye personal identity to a mind. In turn, he attacks the idea that personal identity can be defined in terms of physical attri yetes. Chisholm shows that although things be constantly changing, they still remain the same. He argues that it is the mind that holds ou r identity, regardless of physical alteration. In my view, the physicalist perspective of identity is the most logical when contrasted to the mentalist argument simply due to the fact that we do ready a self-identity, and Nagel does not attempt to define what it is.Lockes argument finds a middle ground amongst Nagel and Chisholm as he argues for a conscious and bodily continuity of the mind. In order to recognise the mind-body problem and argue that identity is a development of the mind, Nagels position must be discerpd. Firstly, when addressing the mind-body problem, Nagel states that one cannot explain the mind body relationship through logic, functions, or intentions. He argues that these states can be ascribed to robots that may indeed behave like people, however robots do not construe anything, and it is experience that influences the mind (436).Nagels bat analogy helps change integrity his position on experience which is that no one can experience the same thing as ano ther. He claims that even to form a conception of what it is Kristen Biduk 6949215 like to be a batone must take up the bats point of view (442). Meaning, one must have the same thinking patterns as the other which Nagel argues is impossible. He argues that it is our consciousness which supplys the mind-body problem. Although one can relate to what it is like to be a bat, it is impossible to fully comprehend it because in order to fit a bat, conscious-ness must be forgotten.For that reason, one cannot know that others have a mind, but one can perceive that they do. Chisholm opens his argument with providing an analysis of the Ship of Theseus and explains that identity is transitive, meaning that it is always changing. Similarly, he uses the example of the river and how although it is the same exact river, it is disposed(p) antithetical identities leveld on geographical location. The identity of the river is changing. found on his view of alteration, Chisholm suggests three pos sibilities for alteration and identity.Firstly, we can deny the transitivity of identity, but he proves this to be a problem. His second suggestion is that nothing alters, but this too proves to be problematic. For example, if one was to cross the border of the United States of the States and the border patrol officer asked if he was the same as the person in the photo, he would say no. Because, when that photo was taken he had accepted characteristics, and now, x amount of years later he has different characteristics, and is at that placefore a different person. Clearly this is an issue.Thirdly, he analyzes Butlers position on the misuse of the word is in that, for example there exists something at a certain place (P) at a certain time (t) that is identical with same thing at a different place (Q) at a different time (t1). By face identical, he means they exist in together, however it is mathematically impossible. He concludes that such things ar entia per alio (made of). Enti a per alio is something that exists because a Kristen Biduk 6949215 mind make waters it up. For example, a pencil is entia per alio because without a mind, it is simply an object. The mind makes the pencil an object for writing. Without a mind freehand meaning to something, that something has no identity.In regards to self-identity, I find it difficult to oppose with the mentalist perspective. Nagels writing, What is it like to be a Bat? does not tender sufficient insight to the development of self and self-identity. He bases his writing unaccompanied based on defining the mind. It is true to say that we cannot properly identify a mind. How can we as a whole, understand something we do not actually know exists? We can assume it exists but it provides no arrest. Based on this belief, Nagel concludes that because we cannot properly identify a mind, we cannot connect personal identity to a mind.But where can we find our personal identity? He claims that our identity does not lie inwardly our physical attributes which leaves identity suspending in the air. The mentalist perspective is limiting in the sense that it does not take in to work out outside variables that can impact ones identity. We be not born with an identity and I feel as though Nagels position is implying that we ar. Additionally, our identity is developed from our consciousness, and we do not become conscious of ourselves at infancy.We develop our self-identity through time and it is consistently changing. Chisholm is a lot more realistic when it comes to defining personal identity. We cannot assume that our identity is stringently based on our minds, for our minds are influenced by our physicality. In turn, our physicality is influenced by society. We identify with ourselves based on what others think of us. For example, if someone weighs three one coulomb pounds, they may identify themselves as unhealthy because that is what society has told them. Similarly, if that three speed of light pound person lost weight and now weighed one hundred and thirty pounds, that Kristen Biduk 6949215 person may identify themselves as healthy.If they used nourishment and exercise as a method to lose the weight, they may identify as athletic. This proves that personal identity is indeed transitive. It will always be in a constant state of change depending on the influences just about them. We have identity because others around us have provided us with our identity. unmatched could argue then that if one was to lose only ten pounds then identity will not change because the change is only slight. If we analyze the Ship of Theseus once more, Chisholm argues that slight changes still have an impact on our identity because our identity is always changing.By using the problem of Theseuss ship however, it gives us ideas of identity for inanimate objects. One could argue that it is not relatable to beings with consciousness however I would have to disagree. Our consciousness, or o ur memories are what hold our self-identity. If we lose an arm or leg, we are still the same person because our minds still hold our memory. While the mentalist perspective does not take into account physical impressions, and the physicalist perspective lacks some insight on our own consciousness, Locke provides an bill that touches on both sides.Locke argues for a conscious continuity and not a bodily one. He begins with clarifying that all minds have a commonality structure wherein there are two qualities within our identity first-string and secondary. The primary quality consists of consciousness. I can identify with myself because I am conscious of my own existence. The secondary qualities consist of qualities that are changing, such as hair length or weight.He insists that our primary qualities are what provide us with identity however he agrees that secondary qualities must be analyzed. Our secondary qualities are always changing while our primary qualities are static. With out the secondary qualities, our identity would not change, Kristen Biduk 6949215 which Chisholm proved. In comparison to both Nagel and Chisholm, Lockes argument holds the truest because he takes into account both perspectives and develops the most logical understanding of identity. Additionally, Locke states that there is a first and third person perspective on identity. The first person identity is what one makes of himself.The third person helps aver ones identity. Both of these together help form ones true personal identity. For one without outside influences has nothing to base their identity on. For example, if one was to look at cases of people raised in isolation, it will be seen that they have no sense of reality or identity. They were left to their own thoughts with no outside stimulation. When they leave their isolated prisons, they rediscover their identity by identifying with their outside influences. In conclusion, it is almost impossible to rationalise the mind/bod y problem.Both Nagel and Chisholms perspectives on identity are fairly vague and both lack a deeper understanding of the mind. I truly believe that it is the mind that holds our identity. However an identity is highly structure by its outside influences. Without a body or without society, one would have no identity. Some can argue that there can be a mind without a body, but it just doesnt make rational sense. If hypothetically, one was to have their mind switched into a different body, he would still identify as himself. For it is our mind that holds our identity, however our mind is within a body.